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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MORLEY WILSON and
MARY ELLEN WILSON,

)
)
)
Plaintiffs-Appellants,)
v.
)
)
)
HUBERT C, LAMBERT, UTAH
)
STATE ENGINEER,
)
Defendant-Respondent. )

Case No. 16612

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This action was initiated pursuant to the provisions of Section 73-3-14, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, to review a
decision of the State Engineer dated January 10, 1968, rejecting four applications to appropriate water.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
This action was dismissed with prejudice (R. 29) on Respondent's Motion to Dismiss (R. 17) which was filed pursuant to the
provisions of Section 73-3-15, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, for failure of Plaintiffs-Appellants to prosecute this action
to final judgment in the District Court within two years after it
was initiated.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks to affirm the Order of the District Court
dismissing this action with prejudice and to sustain the constitutionality of Section 73-3-15.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent does not believe there is any substantial

dis~.

between the parties concerning the basic facts of this case, t
there is disagreement between the parties concerning the lega;
significance of certain events that have transpired.

Since

Appellants have elected to rely on their Memorandum in the tr:
court as their brief in this Court, the traditional statement
facts with citations to the record has not been presented tot
Court.

Consequently, it is believed that a sununary of the per:

ent facts will be helpful in evaluating the legal arguments wb.
follow.
This action was filed on March 11, 1968, to review a decis:
of the State Engineer rejecting four applications to

appropri~

water from the Escalante Valley Groundwater Basin in Iron Count
Utah

(R. 1).

Respondent State Engineer answered the Complaint

on April 22, 1968 (R.

2).

Very little transpired until the mat:

was set for Trial on September 17, 1973 (R.

3).

That Trial set·

ting was vacated because of illness of the Plaintiff (the prese:
Appellants' predecessor in interest)

(R. 4).

The lower court

again set this matter for Trial on May 4, 1977 (R. 5).

Follow1:

receipt of this notice, Appellants requested the lower court to
vacate the Trial setting.

This request was contained in a letU

to the lower court dated April 20, 1977, and sets forth Appellar
reasons for the request (R. 6).
quest.

The lower court granted that

IE

Then, on May 17, 1977, Appellants filed a motion to sub·
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stitute Appellants as plaintiffs (R. 13), accompanied by a stipulation from Respondent to this substitution (R. 12).

The lower

court granted this motion on May 19, 1977 (R. 11).
On January 10, 1978, the trial court, on its own motion,
issued an Order to the parties to appear on March 6, 1978, and
show cause why this action should not be dismissed for failure
to prosecute (R.

8).

Following receipt of this Order, Appellants

(on February 13, 1978) filed a request for Trial setting (R. 9).
On March 6, 1978, the Court provided by Minute Entry that the
Order to Show Cause be stricken and the matter again be
set for Trial (R. 14).
Appellants filed "Plaintiffs' First Interrogatories to Defendant" on October 3, 1978 (R. 15).

On October 16, 1978, Respondent

filed a Motion to Dismiss this action pursuant to the provisions
of Section 73-3-15, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended.

Upon

motion of Respondent, the lower court granted an extension within
which to answer Appellants' Interrogatories, pending disposition
of Respondent's Motion to Dismiss (R. 21).

Following briefing

and oral argument by the parties, the lower court granted Respondent's Motion (R. 29), and Appellants filed this appeal.

ARGUMENT
I.

INTRODUCTION
Section 73-3-15, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, man-

dates the dismissal of any action to review a decision of the
St3te Engineer wl1ich is not prosecuted to final judgment in the
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the district court within two years after it is filed.

More

than ten years elapsed between the initiation of this action c
March 11, 1968, and the filing of Respondent's Motion to
on October 16, 1978.

Dis~
w~-

The questions before this Court are

ther the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing this
acticn with prejudice and, if not, whether Section 73-3-15 is
constitutional statute.
II.

THIS ACTION WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE
UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 73-3-15
A.

Introduction
It should be noted that the majority of Appellants'

Memorandum before the trial court-which now constitutes their
brief before this Court-consists of arguments attacking the
constitutionality of Section 73-3-15.

However, Appellants alsc

assert that Respondent had, by his actions, waived, and is
estopped to assert the provisions of Section 73-3-15 (Points !'1
and

v,

Appellants' Memorandum) .

In Point VI, Appellants atternr [

to distinguish Dansie v. Lambert, 542 P.2d 742
these reasons.

(Utah 1975) for

This Court, in the Dansie case, construed the

dismissal provisions of Section 73-3-15 as mandatory.

In May

C:1

this year this Court again affirmed the mandatory nature of th;
statute in Provo City v. Hansen (::Jo. 15772, May 14, 1979).
pellants' Memorandum does not adc. _-es:o th is latter case.

Ap-

Appar-

ently Appellants concede that so. -c. ::e•v ground-such as the uncc,
sti tutionali ty of the statute-is rec:;uired for them to pre'1ail
in this action.
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B.

Effect of Dansie v. Lambert and Provo City v. Hansen
It seems clear beyond question that the decisions of

this Court in Dansie v. Lambert, supra, and Provo City v. Hansen,
supra, which construe the meaning of Section 73-3-15, mandate
the dismissal of this action and fully support the action taken
by the lower court.

Section 73-3-15 specifies that the action

must be concluded in the trial court within two years and "All
suits heretofore or hereafter commenced must be dismissed
unless such suits are or were prosecuted to final judgment within
the time specified above;

This Court first construed

this legislation in Dansie v. Lambert, supra, approximately four
years ago.

In that action, an appeal was taken from a decision

of the State Engineer, but the action was still pending some
twenty-six months after the Complaint had been filed.

The trial

court granted a motion to dismiss the complaint with prejudice
as to all defendants, including the State Engineer (even though
the State Engineer did not join in the motion to dismiss) .

On

appeal, this Court affirmed the decision of the trial court and
held that the language of Section 73-3-15 was mandatory and that
the trial court had no option but to dismiss the action.

In so

doing, this Court stated:
Some may not approve the legislation, subject of
this case, but in substance and effect it is nothing
more nor less than a limitations statute, which may
be displeasing to one who is its victim, but which
like other similar statutes is one of repose, designed
to put a time barrier against ~itigation'. in determining the precious water rights in this arid state. W~
are not they that may question the wisdom of the l~gis
lature on any constitutional or prejudiciality basis
under the circumstances here.
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Plaintiff does not claim the statute is or is
not mandatory.
His sole point on appeal is that
the trial judge erred in granting the motion as to
the Engineer. The fallacy of the contention lies
in the fact that the statute has nothing to do with
joinder of parties, dismissal as to parties and the
like, but simply applies to the life or death of a
cause of action.
If plaintiff should contend that
the statute is not mandatory, then in addition to
other authorities unnecessary to cite here, this
court, in a very recent case, Herr v. Salt Lake
County, 525 P.2d 728 (Utah) 1974, and cases therein
mentioned, seem to be quite dispositive as to any
interpretation of the words "shall" and "must" used
in the statute here (73-3-15), as being anything but
mandatory, and not discretionary.
(542 P.2d at 744;
Emphasis supplied by the Court) .
Within the last six months this Court again considered the
impact of the dismissal provisions of Section 73-3-15 in Provo
City v. Hansen, supra.

This action was an appeal from a decis1c

of the State Engineer conditionally approving a change applicat:,
The action had been pending for approximately three years, and
some discovery had taken place when the Intervenors in the suit
filed to dismiss it with prejudice.

The trial court granted th:·.

I
1

motion, and this Court affirmed the mandatory nature of the pro·
visions of Section 73-3-15 and reaffirmed the principles announc'
in the Dansie decision:
The first sentence of the above-quoted provision
gives the court discretion to dismiss an action upon
the grounds of Rule 41 generally, including failure
to prosecute with diligence.
However, if over.two
years have elapsed since the filing of the action, a
plaintiff has failed to prosecute with diligence as a
matter of law and the court must dismiss the action.
This Court has clearly ruled upon the mandatory nature
of this provision.
In Dansie v. Lambert the Court
made the following observation:
If plaintiff should contend that the statute is
not mandatory, then in addition to other auth-
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orities unnecessary to cite here, this court,
in a very recent case, Herr v. Salt Lake County,
525 P.2d 728 (Utah), 1974, and cases therein
mentioned, seem to be quite dispositive as to
any interpretation of the words 'shall' and 'must'
us~d in the statute here (73-3-15), as being anything but mandatory, and not discretionary.
The reasons for the mandatory nature of the dismissal
are also articulated in Dansie as follows:
Some may not approve the legislation, subject
of this case, but in substance and effect it is
nothing more nor less than a limitations statute,
which may be displeasing to one who is its victim, but which like other similar statutes is one
of repose, designed to put a time barrier against
litigation, in determining the precious water
rights in this arid state . . . •
From the pleadings it is clear that plaintiffs have
failed to prosecute the suit to final judgment within
two years after it was filed, and the dismissal was
therefore proper.
The Court also held that the dismissal with prejudice was
proper because to do otherwise would allow a plaintiff to circumvent~and

would be contrary

to~the

purpose of the statute:

Plaintiff's argument that the trial court abused
its discretion in dismissing the action with prejudice
rather than without prejudice is without merit. To
dismiss without prejudice is to give a party an additional one year within which to commence a new action
to final judgment. Such a result is contrary to the
whole tenor of the statute and hence, the dismissal
must be with prejudice. The provision that an action
to review the State Engineer's decision shall be dismissed if not filed within 60 days after notice of
the decision precludes the filing of a "new action"
in water cases of this type.
This Court's rulings in the Dansie and Provo City cases
are completely dispositive of this appeal, and the decision of
the lower court should be affirmed.
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..
C.

No Waiver or Estoppel
Appellants attempt to develop the argument (at Points

IV and V of their Memorandum)

that Respondent has somehow "wa:

or is "estopped" to assert the dismissal provisions of Sectior.
7 3-3-15.

However, this Court noted in the Provo City case the:
The mandatory language of the act requires a
plaintiff to take advantage of other remedies
available to him within the allotted time where
the opposing party attempts to purposefully delay
the case.
In any event, we are not convinced
that anyone in the instant case was responsible
for the delay other than plaintiff.
(See Footnote
No. 3).

Further, as will be shown in the following section of this
Brief, there is absolutely no basis for asserting that Responde
in any way delayed the trial of this matter or provided any bas.
for Appellants to assert waiver or estoppel.

What the record

does show is that every delay and postponement that has occurre.
in this action has been at the request of Appellants.

The fac:

is that this action had been pending for over ten years when

R~

pendent filed his Motion to Dismiss, and had been set for Tria1 I
twice~with

both settings continued at the request of Appellant:

None of the delays in this action have been caused by Responden:

Appellants have had more than ample opportunity to conclude th1:
action, but have failed to do so.

It is not Respondent's

resp~

sibility to see that Appellants properly pursue their case:
Respondent further contends that the doctrine
of estoppel has application to proceedings of this
nature; that if the defendant rests his oars and
permits the case to remain untried he should not
be heard to complain; and that in any event he must
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show prejudice. But "it is the plaintiff upon whom
the duty rests to use diligence at every stage of
the proceeding to expedite his case to a final determination." J.C. Penney Co. v. Superior Court, Cal.App.,
336 P. 2d 545.
(Thran v. First Judicial District Court,
380 P. 2d 297 (Nev. 1963)).
Respondent was never asked to waive the requirements of Section 73-3-15, and certainly would not have done so had he been
approached on this subject.
record to suggest otherwise.

There is absolutely nothing in the
Respondent's lack of resistance

to Appellants' efforts to delay trial of this case cannot now be
used against Respondent to justify Appellants' inaction.
clear beyond question.

This is

In addition to Provo City v. Hansen, supra,

see Johnson v. Harber, 582 P.2d 800 (Nev. 1978); Bank of Nevada v.
Friedman, 476 P.2d 172 (Nev. 1970); Featherstone v. Hanson, 338
P.2d 298 (N.M. 1959); Miller & Lux v. Superior Court, 219 Pac.
1006

(Calif. 1923); and Taylor v. Shultz, 144 Cal. Rep. 114 (Calif.

1978).

The cases cited by Appellants simply do not support the

argument which they assert under the facts of this case.
Appellants' effort to shift the blame onto Respondent for
their failure to pursue this action basically falls into three
broad categories.

First, Appellants argue that Respondent is

foreclosed from advocating dismissal of this action because Respondent did not raise this matter sooner.

In this regard, Appel-

lants are critical of Respondent for such actions as stipulating
to the substitution of Appellants as parties; not objecting to
the continuances requested by Appellants; and failing to urge
the trial court to dismiss this action when that court noticed

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

up the dismissal of this action on its own motion.

Secondly,

Appellants assert that Respondent's conduct caused them to purchase land which they would not have other.vise purchased.

And

third, Appellants claim that for a portion of the time this
action was pending Appellants were apparently represented by a:.
unlicensed attorney.
1.

None of these arguments have any merit.

Respondent's Actions before the Trial Court
As pointed out above, Respondent's responsibility

as defendant in this action is to meet Appellants step by step
as the action p regresses .

It is not Respondent's place to tell

Appellants how to structure their lawsuit and what the impacts
may be if various alternative courses are followed.

With respe:

to Respondent's stipulating that the present Appellants couldb;
substituted as plaintiffs, that is all the Stipulation containe:
(R.

12).

. 1
This was a pro forma act by Respondent, and certain 1·

I
I

did not require Respondent to completely evaluate his case at
that time and advise Appellants what legal strategies he would
follow in the future.

Appellants never requested a stipulatior.

I

from Respondent that he do any more than simply agree to a substitution of parties, and that is all that Stipulation did.

It,
I

did not in any way purport to define Respondent's future conduc:\
in this litigation, and does not foreclose Respondent from asse:
ing the provisions of Section 73-3-15.

See Featherstone v. Har.-

~, supra, Thran v. First Judicial District Court, supra, and

Taylor v. Shultz, supra.
Appellants are also critical of Respondent =or 3cqu~escinq
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,
1

in continuances of trial dates, but Appellants conveniently
overlook the fact that it was they who wanted the trial dates
postponed~and

not Respondent.

For Appellants to now claim

that Respondent must accept the responsibility for Appellants
having had the trial of the case continued on two different
occasions is ludicrous.

It is also important to note that

Appellants were assigned the prior plaintiff's interest in this
action in August of 1976 (Ex. 2 to R.

7), but did not petition

the lower court to substitute parties plaintiff until May of
1977 (R. 13).
Appellants also criticize Respondent for not joining with
the lower court when that

court~on

its own motion-:--was going

to dismiss this action for Appellants' failure to prosecute
(R.

8).

This action was initiated by the lower court on its

own motion in order to dispose of this stale litigation.

This

action by the lower court was, of course, not initiated under
the provisions of Section 73-3-15.

Respondent had no obligation

to join with the court in this court-initiated action.
the lower court did not pursue the matter.

Further,

It simply struck

the Order to Show Cause and stated that the matter would be set
for Trial (R. 14).

This was apparently done on Appellants' rep-

resentation that the matter was ready for Trial (R. 9).

However,

the plain fact is that Appellants filed their Request for Trial
Setting in February of 1978 (R. 9), but did not initiate discovery in this action until October of that year when they submitted
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their first interrogatories to Respondent (R. 15).

It is

obvious from even a cursory reading of those interrogatories
that much of the information being sought demonstrates that
Appellants were still only in the initial stages of getting
this matter prepared for Trial.

And this was over ten years

after the action had been filed.

What the foregoing comes

down to is nothing more than a thinly-disguised effort on the
part of Appellants to shift the responsibility to Respondent
for actions which Appellants have taken to delay this litigation.
2.

Aopellants' Purchase of Property
In a further effort to convince this Court that

Respondent is somehow responsible for Appellants' situation,
Appellants assert that their purchase of certain land was a
direct result of Respondent's conduct.

This is absolutely un-

true, as will be demonstrated by the following discussion.

The

contract of sale for the property involved is attached to Appel·I
lants' Memorandum as Exhibit 2.

This document is dated August

I

6, 1976, but Appellants waited until the following April to haVE!
the sale approved by the probate court (R. 7) .

This contract

involved the sale of private property which does not involve
Respondent in any way, and Appellants do not allege that it does
Rather, Appellants adopt the curious argument that this contract
would not have been executed if Appellants were not somehow goi;
to receive the cooperation of Respondent.

For Appellants to
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claim that a contract in which Respondent was not involved
could in some way operate to dictate the future conduct of
Respondent is ridiculous:
But there is an even more fundamental flaw in Appellants'
logic~and perhaps in their business judgment as well~if they

predicated their purchase of this ~and upon these applications.
The four applications involved in this lawsuit were rejected
by the State Engineer.

Neither Appellants nor-their predecessor

had any right whatsoever to use any water under these filings
unless the decision of the State Engineer was reversed.

Thus,

at the time this contract was executed, there was absolutely no
water right in existence under the subject applications.

This

is not a situation of the State Engineer changing his position
and telling a water user that he no longer has a water right
which the State Engineer had previously granted.

Rather, it is

a situation where the State Engineer has taken the position that
there is no unappropriated water in the area, and he has pursued
a consistent course of action to sustain that determination.

See

McGarry v. Thompson, 114 Utah 442, 201 P.2d 288 (1948) and Whitmore v. Welch, 114 Utah 578, 201 P.2d 954 (1949).
Another large gap in Appellants' argument is that the four
applications involved in this appeal are not even filed for the
land covered by this contract.

This agreement covers the pur-

chase by Appellants of 960 acres located in the East 1/2 of
Section 7 and Section 9, T32S, Rl3W, SLB&M (1[1, Ex. 2 of Appellants' Memorandum).

None of these applications were filed on
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this acreage.

Applications Nos. 24625 and 24626 were filed

for irrigation of land in Section 17, T31S, Rl3W, SLB&M.

App-

lication No. 24624 sought to appropriate water for use in part
of Section 20, T31S, Rl3W, SLB&M, and Application No. 24627
covers a portion of Section 23, T31S, Rl3W, SLB&M.
In sum, Appellants have offered absolutely no basis for
arguing to this Court that Respondent was in any way responsib:
for Appellants' purchase of property, and are being less than
candid with this Court to suggest otherwise.
3.

Appellants' Change of Attorneys
It is difficult to see the relevance of the argume,

made by Appellants concerning the prior plaintiff's attorney.
The fact that that attorney had his license suspended for nonpayment of license fees is totally immaterial.

No one was awa:

of this fact until Appellants' present counsel raised the matlt
But Appellants do not

argue~nor

could

they~that

denied the prior plaintiff access to the court.

this somehow
It did not.

Prior counsel had full and complete participation in the actior.
to the extent he desired to do so.

Further, it is interesting

to note that that attorney was an active member of the Utah Ba:
for over a three-year period after this action was

filed~which

is one year beyond the time frame provided in Section 73-3-15
for conclusion of this action in the trial court.

Carelessness

or neglect of counsel will not serve to toll the statute
v. Cook, 137 Cal.Rptr. 434

(~

(Calif. 1977) and Brown v. Lufkin
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&

Machine Co., 487 P.2d 1104 (N.M. 1971)).

In affirming the dismissal of an action for failure to prosecute under the New Mexico statute dealing with the dismissal
of actions where the argument was made~among others~that the
changing of counsel was grounds for preserving the action beyond
the statutory period, the New Mexico Supreme Court ruled that:
With respect to the third assertion, claiming
either a waiver or estoppel, it is agreed by the
parties that there was never any agreement or
apparently even discussion between any of the
attorneys with respect to a stipulation of waiver
of the two-year limitation. Actually, the only
claim of consequence upon which plaintiff relies
is the fact that after the two-year statute had
run from the date of the filing of the original
complaint, plaintiff's original attorneys were
discharged, new attorneys employed, settlement
negotiations entered into, depositions of the parties taken, and substantial sums paid by the plaintiff to his new attorneys for fees and costs.
It
should be mentioned that, according to the correspondence between plaintiff and his new attorneys,
one of the main purposes of the taking of the depositions was in order that the new attorneys could
competently advise the plaintiff as to the possible
outcome of the litigation.
We fail to see anything in any of the actions
on behalf of the defendant which would create an
estoppel. There is nothing before us to even intimate any promise, duty or holding out on the part
of the defendant upon which the plaintiff relied
which could in this case bring the doctrine of estoppel to bear. Plaintiff's situation was not
worsened by reason of any of the acts of the defendant.
See State ex rel. Fitzhugh v. City Council of
Hot Springs, 1952, 56 N.M. 118, 241 P.2d 100; Continental Pacific Lines v. Superior Court, 1956, 142
Cal.App.2d 744, 299 P.2d 417; and Ruby v. Wellington,
Cal.App.1958, 327 P.2d 586. Certainly~ t~e ~efe~d-.
ant cannot be held responsible for plaintiff s difficulty, whatever it was, with his own highly reputable
attorneys.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

15

In view of our prior pronouncements with respect
to the statute, we are unable to find in this case
anything which would amount to a waiver on the part
of the defendant to file his motion.
There was no
conduct on the part of the defendant causing any
actual delay.
The fact that the defendant did not
file his motion immediately upon the expiration of
the two years is certainly not a waiver.
There is
no duty on the part of the defendant to bring the
case to trial, this responsibility being entirely
upon the plaintiff, and the plaintiff failed to do
so. See Ernrnco Ins. Co. v. Walker, 1953, 57 N.M.
525, 260 P.2d 712; and Pettine v. Rogers, supra.
(Featherstone v. Hanson, supra at 300 (1959)).
Also, it must be remembered that it was these Appellants
who requested that the most recent trial setting be vacated in
May of 1977 (R. 6), which was approximately nine months after
the Appellants purchased the rejected applications involved in
this litigation (Ex. 2 to R. 7).

Thus, these Appellants had

asserted an interest in this litigation for over two years before Respondent filed his Motion to Dismiss.

Further, after

all the delays that had occurred, it was not until October of
1978 that Appellants initiated discovery in this case (R. 15).
But the relevant point here is that the provisions of Section 73-3-15 apply to the cause of action, and not to who the
parties are at any particular time or what counsel represents
them.

This is absolutely clear from the terms of the statute,

and to suggest otherwise would totally defeat the purpose and
goal of this legislation.

As pointed out in the Dansie case,

"The fallacy of the contention lies in the fact that the statu~
has nothing to do with joinder of parties, dismissal as to par-
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ties and the like, but simply applies to the life or death of
a cause of action"

(542 P.2d at 744).

It comes down to this~

this Court, in Dansie and Provo City, left no room for equivocation or exception, and, try as they might, Appellants cannot
distinguish or escape the clear and unmistakable language of
those opinions.

The fact is that this case, which had been

pending for more than ten years, was properly dismissed by the
lower court.

The burden is upon Appellants to show that the

trial court abused its discretion in dismissing this action,
and Appellants have failed to sustain this burden (Thompson Ditch
Co. v. Jackson, 29 Ut.2d 259, 508 P.2d 529 (1973) and Westinghouse v. Larsen, 544 P.2d 876 (Ut. 1975)).
III.

SECTION 73-3-15 IS A VALID EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE
POWER AND IS CONSTITUTIONAL
A.

Preface
In an effort to escape the clear and unequivocal deci-

sions of this Court, Appellants have sought to have Section 73-3-15
declared unconstitutional.

At Points I, II and III of their Memo-

randum, Appellants raise and discuss three separate arguments in
a vain attempt to demonstrate the unconstitutionality of this
legislation.

Each of these arguments is answered below, but it

must also be remembered that there is a strong presumption of the
constitutionality of any statute, and if there is any doubt as to
the validity of any act, the court has an obligation to resolve
it in favor of its constitutionality.

Further, a court will not
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judge an act invalid unless in its judgment there is a clear,
complete and unmistakable constitutional violation, and the
whole burden of proving the unconstitutionality lies upon the
party asserting that position.

Plaintiffs have totally failed

in that regard in each of the constitutional objections they
have raised in this action

(Gubler v. Utah State Teachers' Re-

tirement Board, 113 Utah 188, 192 P. 2d 580

(1948); Patterick v.

Carbon Water Conservancy District, 106 Utah 55, 145 P.2d 503
(1944); Thomas v. Daughters of Utah Pioneers, 114 Utah 108, 19"
P.2d 477

(1948); State Water Pollution Control Board v. Salt L;

City, 6 Ut.2d 247,
B.

311 P.2d 370

(1957)).

No Violation of Separation of Powers
Appellants first argue that the dismissal provision of

Section 73-3-15 is unconstitutional because it violates the se;·
aration of powers principle provided for in Section 1, Article
of the Utah Constitution.

The essence of Appellants' arg~~ent

is that the mandatory effect of this statute is an unconstitutional intrusion into the judiciary because it is telling the
courts how and when to decide matters.
Appellants'

The basic fallacy of

argument-and the one in which they seer.i to persist-

is that the mandate of §73-3-15 is totally and squarely with tr.Er
Appellants, and not with the Court.

The impact of this statute

is simply that when a water user appeals a decision of the StatE
Engineer, he does so with the express knowledge and condition
that he must conclude the litigation in the trial court within
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a two-year period or must suffer the consequences of the statute.
This is not unreasonable, and does provide to any litigant who is
interested in actively pursuing such an appeal sufficient time to
conclude it in the trial court.

Appellants certainly are in no

position to complain about a two-year time period when this action
has been pending for over ten years, and has been set for Trial
twice~only

to be vacated at Appellants' request.

Section 73-3-15 is not the type of legislation referred to in
the cases cited in Appellants' Memorandum as constituting an interference with a judicial function.

Rather, it embodies a valid

exercise of legislative power dealing with the limitation of an
action, and is clearly constitutional.

That a state may constitu-

tionally place reasonable limitations on actions is not open to
question:
A state may constitutionally shorten the periods
of limitation fixed by previously existing statutes
and make the amended statute applicable to existing
causes of action, provided it affords a reasonable
time within which suits for such existing causes of
action may be commenced. What is a reasonable time
is for the determination of the legislature and the
court will not interfere with the legislative discretion, unless the time allowed is so manifestly insufficient that it amounts to a denial of justice.
(Wolfe v. Phillips, 172 F.2d 481 (10th Cir. 1949);
Emphasis added) .
In Tucker v. McCrory, 266 P.2d 433 (Okla. 1954), the Oklahoma
Supreme court upheld a limitations statute against a claim that
it was a legislative usurping of judicial power:
Defendants argue that sub-section (6) above qu~ted,
violates Article IV, sec. 1 of the Oklahoma Constitution as a legislative usurpation of judicial power
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.. "'. (~)
~eriods

state may constitutionally shorten the
of limitation fixed by previously existing statut7s and make the amended statute applicable to existing causes of action, provided it
affords a reasonable time within which suits for
such causes .... may be conunenced.
(226 P.2d 434
435).
,

See also United States v. Morena, 245 U.S. 392

(1918); Sparlir.

v. Refunding Board, 71 S.W.2d 182 (Ark. 1934).

Clearly the

time allowed under Section 73-3-15 is reasonable when measurec
against the overall public purpose of effective control over
the administration and utilization of the limited water resoun
of this State.
Appellants' reliance on Atchison, T.& S.F. Ry. Co. v. Long
251 Pac. 486 (Okla. 1926) and Lindauer v. Allen, 456 P.2d 851
(Nev. 1969) is misplaced.

In Atchison, the legislation provi&

that the district courts were to try certain classes of cases
within ten days.

Such is not the case

the Appellants, and not the Court.

here~the

burden is on

Further, the time frame in·

valved in Atchison was only ten days (within which the trial
court had to try the matter after the defendant answered) and
was unrealistic and unreasonable.

However, the two years allo•

for Appellants in this litigation to get their case tried is £1
and reasonable.

Appellants have had two opportunities over a

year period within which to conclude this action, but are no
closer now than when the action was filed.

The Lindauer case,

supra, involved an express conflict between the time frame for
dismissal for failure to prosecute as specified in the !Jevada
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Supreme Court's rules and a statute.

The Nevada Supreme court

affirmed the dismissal of the action, concluding that the time
specified in the court's rules prevailed and voided the statute.
No such conflict exists here.

But in any event, as discussed

above, there is no basic constitutional problem with the Legislature having placed such limitations on actions.

Also see

Schultz v. Schultz, 70 Cal.A.2d 293, 161 P.2d 36 (Calif. 1945);
Denver Local Union v. Perry Truck Lines, 106 Colo. 83, 101 P.2d
436

(Colo. 1940); and Town of Chino Valley v. State Land Dept.,

580 P.2d 704 (Ariz. 1978).
C.

No Violation of Equal Protection or Due Process
Appellants' second constitutional argument is that

Section 73-3-15 violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 7,
Article I of the Utah Constitution because persons involved in
appeals of State Engineer's decisions before the enactment of
Section 73-3-15 are not treated exactly the same as those after
enactment of this statute.

Laws must have a beginning, and the

Legislature certainly is not prevented or prohibited from making
changes which affect the rights, duties and obligations of parties involved in litigation or otherwise (Sperry & Hutchison Co.
v. Rhodes, 220 U.S. 502 (1911)).

The Fourteenth Amendment does

not forbid statutes or statutory changes treating rights that
existed prior to enactment of a statute differently from rights
created after enactment of a statute.
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Obviously, in the case of §73-3-15, the Legislature had

t

devise a system to dispose of cases already in existence wher
the statute was enacted, and the method it chose is fair and
reasonable, and certainly has not resulted in the kinds of
excesses that Appellants have attempted to conjure up in thei:
argument.

Whether the method chosen is an ideal one-or whet:

there may be other possible solutions-is immaterial so long ,
the legislation adequately treats and provides a solution for
both categories of litigation.

There is no requirement that

the two categories must be treated exactly the same.

Equal pr

tection does not require that legislation provide exactly the
same procedure for different classes of litigants:
Nor does the equal protection clause exact uniforrni ty of procedure. The legislature may classify litigation and adopt one type of procedure
for one class and a different type for another.
(Dobany v. Rogers, 284 U.S. 362 (1929)).
Due process does not guarantee a particular form or method
of procedure:
Due process of law guarantees to every citizen
the right to have that course of legal procedure
which has been es~ablished in our judicial system
for the enforcement and protection of private rights
(citations omitted).
It contemplates that the defendant shall be given fair notice, and afforded a
real opportunity to be heard and defend (citations
omitted), in an orderly procedure, before Judgment
is rendered against him.
(State v. Chillingsworth,
171 So. 649 (Fl. 1936)).
In the case of Section 73-3-15, it was necessary that the Legi
lature provide a procedure to deal with those individuals who
a?pealed decisions of the State Engineer before the act, becal
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they were not on notice at the time of filing that their suits
were subject to dismissal upon two years failure to prosecute.
Thus, they were given an additional two years to prosecute upon
receiving notice of the statutory requirement in the form of a
motion by the other party to dismiss.

On the other hand, those

(like Appellants herein) who filed after enactment of §73-3-15
were on notice at the time they filed an appeal that their actions
could be dismissed upon motion of a defendant after two years for
failure to prosecute.
Section 73-3-15 is not subject to the challenge that it violates equal protection by an unreasonable classification.
classification therein is reasonably based.

The

It affords to those

filing both before and after its enactment due process of law in
the form of notice that they must prosecute their actions with
expediency.

The very classification which Appellants suggest to

be a violation of equal protection

is necessary to preserve due

process of law to both classes of claimants, and is thus reasonably based.
The cases which Appellants rely on will not support the
argument they have made.

State v. Mason, 94 Utah 501, 78 P.2d

920 (1938), simply supports the general rule that there must be
a reasonable basis to differentiate between classes or categories
which are the subject matter of the law in question.

Such a basis

exists here.
Appellants also cite the New Mexico case of State v. Sunset
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Ditch Co., 145 P.2d 219 (N.M. 1944), in support of their equal
protection challenge, alleging that a legislative classification based entirely upon a time element, with no reasonable
relation to the object of the legislation, is unconstitutional.
However, as Appellants note at page 14 of their Memorandum,
this Court stated in Dansie that Section 73-3-15 is "designed
to put a time barrier against litigation, in determining the
precious water rights in this arid state . .
element is an object of the statute.

Th us , the tim;

The legislative classifr

cation of those filing before and after the act clearly bears ,
reasonable relation to that statutory purpose, and is not constitutionally objectionable.
D.

No Denial of Access to Courts
Appellants' final constitutional argument is that

Section 73-3-15 has the effect of closing the courtroom to Appe
lants in violation of Section 11, Article I, Utah Constitution.
This is most difficult to understand.

Appellants were in court

for over a decade and had this matter set for Trial twice, but

yet still maintain that somehow the Court has been closed to tr
There is simply no basis for making such an argument.

The con·

stitutional guaranty providing for open courts does not create

any new rights for Appellants, but is merely a broad declarati<
of a fundamental protection.

If Appellants' argument were fol

ed to its logical conclusion, the Court would never be able to
dispose of stale litigation.

Certainly such a result was neve
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contemplated by this constitutional provision.

Appellants were

given an express right to present their claim to the Court under
the provisions of Sections 73-3-14 and 73-3-15, and the Legislature can prescribe the method and manner by which Appellants
must pursue their appeal without transgressing Article I, Section
11.

If this were not so, the Legislature would never be able to

specify limitations and conditions on the procedural aspects of
litigation.

This just simply is not the law:

Plaintiff's counsel, however, also contend
that the act is unconstitutional because it deprives a person whose rights are affected from
seeking redress in the courts. This contention,
for the reasons already pointed out, cannot prevail. There is no reason why the Legislature
may not limit the right to assail the regularity
of the formation or organization of a district,
provided a reasonable time is given within which
to bring an action for that purpose. This is
practically all that is attempted by the limitation imposed in the act in question.
(Horn v.
Shaffer, 47 Utah 55, 151 Pac. 555, 558 (1915)).
Also see Brown v. Wightman, 47 Utah 31, 151 Pac. 336 (1915) and
Brown v. Lufkin Foundry and Machine Co., 487 P.2d 1104 (N.M.
1971).
Appellants can derive no comfort from Oklahoma City v. Castleberry,

413 P.2d 556 (Okla. 1966), upon which they rely to support

their argument under this point.

In that case the court correct-

ly set aside a default judgment against a landowner (who was not
represented by counsel) because he had been misinformed by one
of the district judges as to when his case would be heard.

Hence,

the landowner was not present when the hearing was held and his
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default was entered.
this default aside.
tion to this matter.

Certainly the court was correct in sett
However, that case bears no factual relaAppellants attempt to develop the argum;

that the trial court was somehow forever foreclosed from dism
ing this action because it did not do so following issuance

o:

the court's Order to Show Cause on January 10, 1978.

This is

sense~

action~

As previously pointed out in this Brief, this

on the court's own motion and was not initiated pursuant to tr
provisions of Section 73-3-15.

Further, the trial court

did~

pursue the rnatter-i t simply struck the Order to Show Cause ar.
indicated that the matter would be set for Trial (R. 14).

ApF,

lants conveniently overlook the fact that this action has been
pending for over a decade, during which Appellants had two di!
erent opportunities to try the case but failed to do so.

This

a far cry from a situation where the courts have been closed

t

party.
We agree with the appellant that every litigant should
have his day in court; but he should abide by the rule:
(Averette v. Hutchinson, 420 S.W.2d 581 (Ky. 1967)}.

E.

Conclusion
As a concluding comment, it should be noted that the

validity of legislation establishing state control over the ad·
ministration of water has uniformly been upheld in the Western
United States as a valid exercise of the states' policy power
against a variety of constitutional objections (Hutchins, ~
Rights Laws in the Nineteen Western States, Vol. I, P· 314 (Mis
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Pub. No. 1206, U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, 1971)).

There is a

substantial public interest in sound water right administration.
Utah's water code had its beginning around the turn of the century when various statutory provisions were enacted to afford a
more active state role in the administration and distribution
of the water resources of the State.

From that time until 1919,

various statutory provisions were enacted governing Utah's water
resources.

In 1919, the Utah Legislature revised and re-enacted

a comprehensive water code for the State of Utah which encompassed
the allocation, distribution and adjudication of the water rights
of this State.

There have, of course, been a number of amendments

to Utah's water code since that time.

The constitutionality of

this water code has been challenged and, while Section 73-3-15
was not addressed in that litigation, this Court had no difficulty
approving and endorsing the constitutionality of those aspects of
Utah's water code which it has considered.

See Spanish Fork West

Field Irrigation Company v. District Court, 99 Utah 527, 104 P.2d
353 (1940); Eden Irrigation Company v. District Court of Weber
County, 61 Utah 103, 211 Pac. 957 (1922); and Huntsville Irrigation Ass'n. v. District Court of Weber County, 72 Utah 431, 270
Pac. 1090 (1928).
IV.

CONCLUSION
This

action~which

had been pending for over a decade when

Respondent filed his Motion to

Dismiss~was

properly dismissed
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with prejudice by the trial court for failure to prosecute.
Appellants have completely failed to demonstrate that the
trial court abused its discretion in dismissing this action,
and the decision of the lower court should be affirmed.
Further, Section 73-3-15 is clearly a constitutional
exercise of legislative power, and Appellants have failed to
show otherwise.

Attorneys for Utah State
301 Empire Building
231 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 533-4446
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